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INTRODUCTION 
At the very conclusion of their brief, the Garfield County 
respondents finally address the operative impact of article XIII, 
section 5 of the Utah Constitution. They correctly note that it 
"is a constitutional principle which speaks of co-existence, a 
separation of responsibility and of direct accountability between 
local elected officials and their constituents for purely local 
decisions." Brief of Garfield County Respondents at 44 
(hereafter "Resp. Br."). The remainder of the brief, however, 
either ignores this constitutional principle or construes it out 
of existence. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15 (hereinafter the "Act") 
dramatically alters the local property tax levied by the 29 
individual counties of the State.1 Prior to the adoption of the 
Act, each county developed its own assessment budget, levied a 
tax to cover that budget, and was directly responsible to the 
local electorate for that budget. Brief of Appellant at 3-5; 
13-31 (hereafter "App. Br."). These essential, constitutionally 
mandated components of local self-governance are destroyed by the 
Act. The counties no longer establish their own assessment 
budgets; that control instead is shifted to the State Auditor who 
develops "categories of allowable costs" and certifies that 
1/ Respondents concede this point. Resp. Br. 17 ("The utilization of an 
equalized statewide levy approved during the 1986 general legislative 
session was a deviation from the previous authority of each county to 
levy a separate tax for the cost of assessing, collecting and 
distributing property taxes"). 
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individual budgets comply with those "approved categories" of 
costs. Utah Code Ann. 17-19-15(2). The counties, moreover, no 
longer determine the amount of the tax levied to cover "local" 
collection costs. Garfield County, for example, does not set the 
"local levy" (Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15(3)) imposed under the 
Act. The levy, instead, is set by the cumulative actions of 29 
county commissions and is imposed by the State Tax Commission. 
Id. 
Most importantly, however, the Act strips the electorate of 
any control over the local assessment budget. Taxpayers may, as 
the respondents note, "appear at budget hearings in any county" 
to protest the tax collection budget. Resp. Br. 40. What 
respondents fail to recognize is that any such appearance is 
unavailing. Why? Because the "local levy" ultimately assessed 
by the State Tax Commission (Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15(3)) is 
based upon the actions of all 29 counties. Taxpayers in any one 
county, therefore, are powerless to control the "local levy" 
established by the Act. Article XIII, section 5 of the Utah 
Constitution was adopted precisely to prevent this intrusion upon 
the rights of the local electorate. The Best Foods, Inc. v. 
Christensen, 75 Utah 392, 285 P. 1001, 1004 (1930). 
It is no wonder, then, that respondents virtually ignore 
article XIII, section 5 of the Utah Constitution in the body of 
their brief. Instead, respondents assert that article XIII, 
section 5 is irrelevant because Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15 is 
indistinguishable from numerous other statutory provisions and, 
in any event, furthers a "state" purpose. Resp. Br. 11-33. They 
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next assert that the Act does not violate the constitutional 
prohibition against involuntary revenue sharing because it merely 
establishes consensual "state-wide funding." Resp. Br. 34. 
Respondents then submit that — notwithstanding the absence of 
any discovery and the existence of factual disputes highlighted 
in their own brief — the trial court properly granted summary 
judgment on appellants due process, equal protection and takings 
claims. Resp. Br. 36-43. Respondents finally argue that 
appellant lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of 
the Act. These submissions do not withstand scrutiny and will be 
addressed in turn. 
I. THE ACT PLAINLY VIOLATES ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 5 OP 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION; RESPONDENTS' CONTRARY READING 
RENDERS THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION VIRTUALLY 
MEANINGLESS 
Respondents first assert that the Act is simply another — 
and unremarkable — imposition of duties upon local government by 
the state legislature. Resp. Br. 11-17. Respondents continue by 
arguing that the duties imposed by the Act further a state 
purpose and therefore escape constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 
17-33. The first submission ignores the fundamental differences 
between the Act and the legislative examples cited by 
respondents. The second argument sweeps too broadly: if the Act 
passes muster under article XIII, section 5 merely because it 
furthers a broadly defined "state purpose," the constitutional 
prohibition will have been rendered a virtual dead letter. 
In attempting to establish that the Act is merely another 
legislative proscription affecting local government, respondents 
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point to several instances in Title 17 of the Utah Code that 
require the counties to discharge certain duties as agents of the 
state. Resp. Br. 27-28 (service of process by county sheriff 
when the state is party to a lawsuit; counties must prosecute 
state crimes and assist attorney general; county assessors must 
adhere to Tax Commission rules). Respondents continue by 
pointing out that "[t]he State of Utah has a long history of 
involvement in and supervision over property tax assessment and 
collection matters." Id. at 28; see also id. at 11-17 (citing 
statutes). The examples cited by respondents, however, differ 
from the Act in one critical aspect: in none of the cited 
examples — except in the instance of the Uniform School Fund 
(which is constitutionally distinguishable and is addressed 
below) — does the legislature impose a tax for local purposes. 
Appellant does not dispute that the state may direct the 
actions of certain county officials. Nor does appellant dispute 
that, under article XIII, section 11 of the Utah Constitution, 
the State Tax Commission has authority to "revise the tax levies 
of local governmental units" and to "equalize the assessment and 
valuation of property within the counties." Appellant further 
recognizes that, in furtherance of this constitutional authority, 
the legislature has granted the Tax Commission broad oversight 
powers regarding assessment and equalization. See Resp. Br. at 
12, 14. However, neither the state's authority over the actions 
of county sheriffs, attorneys and assessors, article XIII, 
section 11, nor the various statutes cited by respondents, 
authorize the legislature to actually impose a tax to fund the 
- 4 -
operations of local governmental units• While the legislature 
may direct the expenditure and usage of local tax dollars (such 
as requiring county sheriffs to serve state process) and provide 
the Tax Commission with extensive oversight responsibilities, 
"[u]pon principle and the great weight of authority, section 5 of 
article 13 of the Utah Constitution precludes the Legislature 
from imposing a . . . tax upon the inhabitants of a city, town or 
county for the sole purpose of raising revenue for such city, 
town or county." The Best Foods, Inc. v. Christensen, 285 P. at 
1004 (Utah 1930). That is precisely what the Act attempts to do. 
That is also precisely why it is unconstitutional. 
The sole instance cited by respondents where the state 
legislature has imposed a tax upon local government is 
constitutionally distinguishable from the Act. In an attempt to 
validate the Act, respondents repeatedly invoke the Uniform 
School Fund, and various programs enacted pursuant thereto. 
E.g., Resp. Br. 13, 15, 18, 20, 33, 47, 48 (arguing that the Act 
is identical to the Uniform School Fund and related revenue 
raising and redistribution measures). The State of Utah does 
levy a state-wide property tax to fund the "basic state-supported 
school program." Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-902.5. The state 
accordingly establishes a state-wide mill levy, closely monitors 
the collection of that levy, and redistributes funds collected by 
the various school districts throughout the state. Id.2 This 
2/ School districts that collect revenues in excess of their allocated 
share of basic education revenues turn them over to the state for 
redistribution to less affluent school districts. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-2-905. The state has also, as respondents note, ordered the 
(Footnote 2 Continued on Next Page) 
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statutory scheme, of course, bears a significant resemblance to 
the structures established by the Act. But, rather than 
supporting the constitutionality of the Act, the Uniform School 
Fund illustrates the Act's patent unconstitutionality. 
State-wide taxes to support public education stand upon 
entirely different constitutional grounds than state-wide taxes 
to defray local tax collection costs. Article X, section 1 of 
the Utah Constitution requires the legislature to "provide for 
the establishment and maintenance of a uniform system of public 
schools, which shall be open to all children of the State, and be 
free from sectarian control." To enable the State to establish 
and maintain a public school system, the Utah Constitution 
originally contained in article X, section 3, a clause 
establishing the State School Fund and Uniform School Fund. That 
clause specifically provided for the State to raise revenues for 
the school funds from various sources and subjected the State's 
power only to article XIII, section 7 of the Utah Constitution, 
which established a maximum mill levy rate on tangible property. 
See Utah Const, former article X, section 3 (amended and 
renumbered 1986). Article X, section 3, as amended and 
renumbered in 1986 expressly authorizes the legislature to impose 
a tax for schools, stating as follows: 
There is established a Uniform School Fund which shall 
consist of revenue from the following sources: . . . (c) 
other revenues which the Legislature may appropriate. 
(Footnote 2 Continued from Previous Page) 
preparation of revised property tax plats to effectuate collection of 
the Uniform School Fund. Resp. Br. 15. 
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Utah Cufibt. •" C, § 5 ThiiLS, jiny L<JA imposed tu muppujirL public 
education i . e state Is ] cvied pu i siitjnt tu this express 
constitutional directive to the legislature and is free of other 
constituti ona] 1 i mi tations on taxati on, such as article XI11 § 5. 
The fact that the legislature can Impose state-wide property 
taxes to support publ i c education, therefore, lends absolutely i i ::» 
support to any claimed prerogative to " i' " v- - for the 
purpose of any county,, city , town or otfc - .;, ^ .^..i 1 
corporation !i I Jtah Const. ar t. XIII, § Indeed, whi 1 e the 
legi s] ati it = i s o ansti t/i iti c: i ia] ] y permitted * ' 
taxes in suppor t of education :i t is cons: ,; ^ uionall .scribed 
from, levying such taxes for 1 ocal purposes - 1 ^ 
There • :: ai i t e ,11 ii t t ] e ic: i it t more :i)veii::: 
t l l e Act I s for a, county purpose . D e s p i t e e x i s t ii lg f a c t u a l 
d i s p u t e s r e g a r d i n g the a c t u a l i mpact of t h e Act (s e e S e c t i o n I 1~ , 
]::: e l c * ) „:! t „:i s a.]::: p a r en: i t fit:: • ::: it t h e f ace • ::: f tl: i = i \ ::: t tl: ia t mon ::i e s 
r a i s e d b;;r tl: ::t„e ': 1 oca l 1 evy n wi 1 1 be \ ised to pay s a l a r i e s and o ther 
c o s t s and t o f i n a n c e c a p i t a l e x p e n d i t u r e s i n c u r r e d by l o c a l 
3 , The d i s t i n c . j w i . . > * i m r i ^ g ^ i a L u n r 3 au tho r i t y to . c v ; •> s - -
taxes for public education and its inability to levy local taxes t^-
local purposes is also reflected in the Utah Code Utah Code Ann 
§ 53-7-15 recites that "the e s t ab1i shme nt o f an e due a t i ona1 sy s t em ,^ 
prim.ar.ily a. state function." Because "local school districts should be 
required to participate on a partnership basis [with the state] in the 
payment of a reasonable portion of the cost of a minimum program." 
(id,)» the Code establishes the board of education of each school 
distr ict as separate and independent taxing dis tr ic ts . Utah Code Ann. 
§ 53-7-9. The education taxes imposed by the state and the school 
distr icts , however, are clearly distinguishable from taxes levied for 
local purposes, 7*>- Utah Code makes clear that "funds for countv 
purposes" are r,-i ; *he "go1! rerni ng body of each count v " "• 7 
Ann. § 59-2, 90 
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county officials in assessing and collecting the local property 
tax. Nothing in respondents' brief refutes the general rule, 
explicated in appellant's opening brief (at 19-28), that "the 
payment of • . . general expenses of local government is a 
corporate purpose within the meaning of constitutional 
limitations upon the taxing power of legislatures in regard to 
county . . . purposes." 106 A.L.R. 906, 914 (1937). Indeed, 
despite respondents' highly technical quibbles with several ear 
decisions of this Court (Resp. Br. 18-23),u respondents 
virtually concede that these decisions support the 
4/ E.g.. B; State v. Eldredge. 27 Utah 477, 76 P. 337 (1904); Bailev v. 
Van Dvke. 66 Utah 184, 240 P. 454 (1925); The Best Foods. Inc. v. 
Christensen. 75 Utah 392, 285 P. 1001 (1930); Smith v. Carbon County. 
90 Utah 560, 63 P.2d 259 (1936). 
Respondents' attempts to avoid the plain impact of this Court's 
earlier decisions are disingenuous at best. For example, respondents 
attempt to distinguish State v. Standford. supra, by suggesting that 
the legislation challenged in that case was found unconstitutional 
because it lacked a legislative explication of a "state purpose." 
Resp. Br. at 19-20. Nothing in Standford. however, suggests that the 
legislature could have required counties to hire fruit tree inspections 
if it had simply taken the time to recite that the state had a 
substantial interest in furthering the economy or protecting public 
health. Article XIII, section 5 of the Utah Constitution does not 
simply disappear when the legislature drafts an appropriate legislative 
preamble. Similarly, even though the constitutional provision at issue 
in State v. Eldredge. supra, has been amended since the decision in 
that case (Resp. Br. at 20-21), nothing in those amendments detracts 
from this Court's observation that "section 5, art. 13 . . . directs 
the Legislature to vest in the corporate authorities the power to 
assess and collect taxes for local purposes." 76 P.2d at 340. Bailey 
v. Van Dvke. 240 P. 454, moreover, stands for the proposition that, 
although the legislature may authorize counties to incur certain 
expenses, it cannot impose taxes upon the counties. App. Br. 18. It 
does not stand for the unsupportable proposition that "the Legislature 
in furtherance of a statewide purpose may require the imposition of 
local tax levies." Resp. Br. 22. Indeed, the only such "statewide 
levy" identified by respondents is the supposedly "analogous Uniform 
School Fund Levy." Id. As noted above, the Uniform School Fund is 
simply not "analogous" to the Act. 
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unconstitutionality of the A c I: , Resp Br at 2 3 (the Court' s 
" e a :i : J } • • I e c : i s :i o i 1 = 3 11 : :ii : t 111 } <: o i i s 11: i e d 11 I = • :: o i i s t i t u t :i o i i a ] 
restriction on the Legislature vis-a-vi s local governments' 
sovereignty") :" 
later cases, furthermore, does not • - as r espondents' submit: -
support the constitutional ity of the A c I: 1 I = .sp Elli : 2 3 This 
(Utah 1975), and Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redevelop., 598 
P. 2d 13 39 (I Jtah 1979) do not grant I: .1 : i Il egi slature the authority 
"resolve identified statewide concerns " Resp, Br 25 Indeed, 
the Court did not \ ipho] d the T Jtah Neighborhood Devel opment Act in 
"T"i: ibe ai l :i Mur i ay Ci b \ :: \ it t l i s I: x • :: ^ a, I grii : • :>i! u id asser ted 1: •} 
respondents: i , e , , that because the 1 egislation served a "state 
purpose* :i t was ( w i thoi it more) consti ti xtiona] Re sp Br at 
.^ cj^ o;..^ - ...ot tliw i e v. v v. i. . u.x^ iv.u,i .^nt, w,w* .. .,.,,_.. .iiBy assert ^ m .*& 
• 'curt in Smith v. Carbon County, 63 P.2d 259, did not address the 
article XIII, section 5 issue,. Resp. Br. 22 ("the article XIII section 
5 issues were not briefed and the Court didn't address them"). This 
assertion, is flatly erroneous. This Court declined to address the 
precise question whether the legislature may "impose an inheritance tax 
for county purposes without offending article 13, section 5, of our 
State Constitution * '• .'d ,\- 262 ? emphasis added ' e Court 
however, did find char . * ^ \\^ - tatutorily Imposed prooate fees were 1 n 
fact taxes, and that U;ev aiererore "must be uniform and may not be 
levied by the Legislature for the use -ind benefit f a county." Id. 
The Court expressly found "that the law fixing the schedule of fees 
. . , must fail because in [sic] conflict with the constitutional 
provisions [including article XIII, section 5] relied upon by 
plaintiff." Id. Smith unequivocally addressed the limitations piaced 
upon the legislature by article XIII, section 5 and this Court struck 
down the s t a tu te bee aus e I, t t: rans gr e s s e d tho s e 1 im 11 a 11 o ns . 
merely redirected funds within a county, and (2) it was a value 
increment financing program that did not, in fact, even impose a 
tax for local purposes. Salt Lake County v. Murray City. 598 
P.2d at 1342 & n. 8; see also Tribe. 540 P.2d at 506 (Crockett, 
J., specially concurring)(a value increment financing scheme is 
constitutional because it does not divest the county of the right 
to set its own mill levy rate). In short, the legislation passed 
constitutional muster because it left the counties with full 
"vested authority to 'collect taxes for all purposes of such 
corporation.'" Salt Lake County v. Murray City, 598 P.2d at 
1342. The same cannot be said regarding the Act. See App. Br. 
33-34 (setting forth in detail the differences between the Act 
and the legislation upheld in Tribe and Murray City). 
The Act, therefore, differs greatly from the supposedly 
"analogous" provisions invoked by respondents. In no other 
instance — except for the completely distinguishable Uniform 
School Fund — has the legislature ever imposed an identifiable 
tax upon county governments to defray the costs of Local 
government. The Act, furthermore, is not supported by precedent, 
whether construed "strictly" or "pragmatically." Resp. Br. 23. 
As a result, respondents' submission reduces to the stark 
proposition that, if the state legislature identifies a state 
purpose for a given enactment, the enactment — without more — 
passes constitutional scrutiny under article XIII, section 5 of 
the Utah Constitution. This Court cannot adopt such a slack 
reading of the Utah Constitution. 
- 10 -
Respondents' ' ' i I .ate purpose11" • M gument fails because i t si mp] y 
proves to :> much. 1 s s i ,ot cull I I ipt-"-*' ::| • M l t - • s • opening br i e 1: (. in, I: 
2 8 - 30), "[s]ince counties are politi ca] subdivisions of the state 
any person nr prnh 1 em nf ' interest ' to ] oca] jI iri sdi ctions 
i il -s ' J IILBI tiL l ! I lit tate " II: / in, in ., i f ai \\ 1 egislati on 
! -urthers a "'state purpose1' automatically passes muster under 
auici- * II section 5 of the Utah Constitution, the 1 Jtah 
ConstiwUL.oi i w'ou] d give way any time, tl ie legislature incanted a 
"state purpose'1, i n a, legislative preamble,, Indeed, if 
respondents'" '"state purpose*" submission is correct, it is hard to 
conceive of any ] eg a si at ion, that woul I eve r transgress the 
strictures of article XIII, section, 5 The constitutional 
provi si Dn \ i : i :i II d b- s essenti al ] ] r mean i ng] ess 
This Cour t has recently re j ected the i de i: it ical "state 
purpose## argument now propounded by respondents, a] belt i i i, a, 
Corp, v. w.:i ]l ]i i: i n s on, 3 2 3 1 2d 106 (Utah ] 98 6) , the Attorney 
General argued that the Utah Techno,] ogj and, Innovation Act, *r.:.-. 
t i p p n > p r i . i ( ! J I I s I 1 1 i il  in mi mi II i II I 11 mi i l l i i * . i r i II! II 1 1 i • i in 1 1 1 I in I  I  i ! I i l l i 
a r t i c l e VI, s e c t i o n in ui. tlie "Utah c o n s t i t u t i o n , winch p r o h i b i t s 
t h e " i t a te from " l e n d f i n q j i t s c r e d i t oi s u b s c r i b i n g ] t o s tock or 
1 II nid'.* i in in I 11 11 ( in n i (ii | II n it t ( Tit ^ r 111 i ,<> 111 I I I n I e i I (i I, I iiiini, " 
Although t h e L o u i t conc luded t i i a t t h e l e n d m q ot p u b l i c monies 
ill ml not v i o l a t e t h e ' ' l e n d i n g nf c red i t 1 * c l a u s e , t h e Cour t 
niPiferttiiHI I .• Ill In I I I I I lllii Id I i1 cou ld n o t mlisc r i I»P I 
private corporations. The Utah Technology Finance Corporate-.,t_ 
diyuing the contrary, sought "judicial approbation uii the ground 
that the subscription to stock in fledgling businesses has been 
found by the legislature to have a public purpose." 72 3 P.2d at 
413. This Court rejected this submission in language that is 
directly applicable to this case fid, at 414): 
[T]he legislature's findings of a public purpose 
are of no avail in this instance. The 
constitutional convention in promulgating section 
29 and its subsequent adoption by the electorate of 
this state have foreclosed any speculation or 
further debate on that issue. Clearly, the 
subscription to stock in emerging business is to 
aid them. Whether the public benefits thereby is 
of no consequence. This means of assistance is 
forbidden by section 29. . . . The state is 
foreclosed from subscribing, even though the 
legislature may determine that public benefits will 
flow therefrom. 
In Utah Technology Finance Corp. v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406 
(Utah 1986), the state legislature attempted to enact legislation 
that was forbidden by the plain language of the Utah 
Constitution. This Court refused to permit such action, despite 
an acknowledged "state purpose" behind the legislation. The same 
result is mandated here. Article XIII, section 5 prohibits the 
legislature from imposing a tax for the purposes of local 
government. The promulgation of this constitutional provision 
"and its subsequent adoption by the electorate of this state have 
foreclosed any speculation or further debate on that issue." 
Utah Technology Finance Corp. v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d at 413-414. 
Whatever the wisdom, efficiency or supposed benefits of 
collecting local governmental costs on a state-wide basis (Resp. 
Br. 11-33), the legislature — no matter how badly it desires to 
do so — is constitutionally proscribed from imposing a tax upon 
the counties to defray local tax collection costs. 
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Respondent . • 1 .it i iiiiil . ippel I nil iqnpt •. I hi ill I hie 
s t a n d a r d tun f i n d i n g a s t a t u t e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s h igh A 
l e g i s l a t i v e enac tment w i l l he found u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , only wtiere 
" :i !:::: ::::] e a r -il y 111' 1 m Ji 111 t <Jis I 1 y ' m i ) 1 11 f j 1 1 • 1 1 i i i i n • 1 1 1 1 1 ' m 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I I I I 11 
Constitution ot the state,1" Ike p Ilk 9 » 1 MI < quoting Thomas v. 
Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah LiiH, n,' p.Ai 4..' 199 
(111 9 4 3 ) ) Til: l e I i ' I C I I M n r - . l i i t P I | ml m H I I I I I I  i iii III| i| u I I m l 
opening br ief, meets that high standanl Che Act is 
"unconstituti onal and must fail." Utah Technology Finance Corp. 
v ._ w i l k i i i s o i :tf " i III1 "ill ! «!, 1 4 . 
. THE ACT TRANSGRESSES THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION 
AGAINST INVOLUNTARY REVENUE SHARING 
Forced horizontal revenue sharinq has always been held to be 
Ml I n I i l l II i l l Ml ' H i III 1 fr« A 1 I I  I ' i I I I i l l ' V ' J L I t o L d L e V . 
S t a n d f o r d . 66 1'. a t l u u J . Indeed, p ru j i t o 198 J , i t was t h o u g h t 
t"hat t h e Ot ih C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o h i b i t e d f e n v o l u n t a r y r evenue 
.li.il" I in| | if I 1 IIII I 11 MI L 11" J v l I I I s e c t Loin 
t h e r e f o r e , was amended in 1 i'l I t o " a l l o w l o c a l government s a t 
t h e i r o p t i o n t o s h a m t . v r evenues " I m p a r t i a l ftnalysi s 1 982 
Vote r I n f o r m a t lun I iiiiii| ill I I n i t i ce nl l e g i s l a t i v e Resear: ch and 
Honera I i iiiiiiiiiii;-*el (emphas i s add* ill Responden t s a t t e m p t t o avoi d 
t h e p l a i n impact of t h e s e f a c t s w i t h a s e r i e s of i n s u b s t a n t i a l 
argumentL 
First * a blatant example of ''double speak" that would make 
George Orwe hlnnli, respondents arque I hat „ i?vrn I'honrih the Act 
mandates redistribution of" local tax revenues, it "does not 
necessarily constitute revenue sharing." Resp. Br. 34. What it 
does constitute, respondents assert, is "merely a state-wide 
funding approach to a matter of statewide concern." Id. Simply 
calling a pig a cow, however, will not permit you to milk it. 
The "state-wide funding approach" mandated by the Act is 
unequivocally revenue sharing. 
Next, assuming that the Act does constitute revenue sharing, 
respondents argue that appellant lacks standing to challenge the 
Act and that the county has, in any event, consented to the 
revenue sharing. The standing argument will be addressed in 
Section IV of this Reply Brief. The "consent" argument rests 
upon resolutions passed by governmental associations not directly 
answerable to the electorate. This claimed "consent" is 
insufficient for reasons already set out at footnote 20 on pages 
35 and 36 of appellant's opening brief. That reasoning will not 
be repeated here. 
Respondents next argue that, even if the Act constitutes 
involuntary revenue sharing, it does not violate article XIII, 
section 5 "when a statewide purpose is involved." Resp. Br. 35. 
This assertion, of course, merely repeats the "state purpose" 
argument addressed above and is insufficient for the reasons 
already noted. 
Finally, respondents argue that the 1983 amendment of article 
XIII, section 5 somehow validates the Act. According to 
respondents, the 1983 amendment to article XIII, section 5 
"allows local governments to voluntarily share their revenues," 
but is "silent as to whether the legislature is prohibited from 
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Resp . Br, • j . The- : o n s t i t u t i jnal ^ a e ^ c e invoked . : e s p o n d e n t s , 
however , l i i i ' l l y a i d s t h e i r c a u s e . The 1983 amendment i s s i l e n t 
r eqd rd i i t u leu i b l d t i v e i v mandated l o c a l i e \ eime s l i a r inu p r e c i s e l y 
bee in i I iii I i I in in has a lways been p r o h i b i t e d unde r a r t i c l e 
X I I I , s e c t ion 5, Th e 19 R li i ni#»ndmen t p e r m i t s t h e i "ou n t i P S ' a t 
t h e i r opt i.""" ' I u 1 i-.11 i. • i I1 , s r , ' "' ' 1 n t«. i«ii,it n 
Pamphlet I to share their revenue, he amendment says nothing 
about legislatively mandated ir P V P O H P nharinq because such 
legis la t i /u a u 11 u 11 11 <*. i} . il i i in i • 11 11111 1 
by a r t i c l e X I I I , s e c t i o n s, S t a t e v . S t a n d f o r d , -o 
( i rHnder th*-1 c o n s t i t u t i o n th ' 1 * i ta te has no pnwor t-n make a 
d i s p o s i t i o n ul < uuiil y lund.. , .nmJ u . i j u u c Llhil. Llii , lit 
a p p r o p r i a t e d f o r o t h e r and d i f f e r e n t p u r p o s e s t h a n t h o s e foi • 
which \\\ i n t h n r i t y nf t h r county t i n y n»>m col 1 ec tod / # ) , 
C o n s t ^ u v i u i u l "s i le im i ' u i I I not save t'espondeiil I i mil I he 
operative force of plain constitutional language. 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
)N APPELLANTS' DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION AND 
TAKINGS CLAIMS PRIOF Tn TO* CONCLUSION OP DISCOVERY 
addition to •* - *- facia ; -. i -noes addressed above, < in 
\ • - p | M- »III 1 , 11 ! , i i } < + i a e 11 c 11 * i o s umm a ry J u d qm e n t, 
appel. nt contends s.*,..*,. . - *<= *pp — vi olatus state 
and feder.il due process, equal protect;or * ...• takings provisions. 
These Irittni i '>1 iluMnihH issues are - - with factual i ssues 
improperly ignored by the trial courf -mary jt ldgmen t of 1: 
claims, therefore, was improper. Bowen v. Riverton. City, 656 
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P. 2d 434 (Utah 1982) (summary judgment is appropriate only where 
there is no genuine issue of material fact).6 
Respondents7 own brief highlights and emphasizes the factual 
disputes that remain on this record. Based on data largely 
obtained from the State Auditor's Office, appellant compiled 
information showing a tremendous increase in tax collection costs 
since the passage of the Act. See Exhibit D to the Complaint; 
App. Br. 5, 15 & n.7. In Davis County alone, appellant's data 
demonstrates a five-fold increase in tax collection costs. 
Respondents, for their part, assert that the "^incontroverted" 
evidence shows a mere 16% increase in tax collection costs in 
Davis County. Resp. Br. 4. The sole basis for respondents' 
factual submission, however, is an affidavit prepared by Brent 
Gardner that was admittedly based upon the out-of-court 
declarations of county auditors. Affidavit of Brent Gardner at % 
5 (R. 202-210). Accordingly, the affidavit is clearly hearsay. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 801(c). An affidavit submitted in support 
of or opposition to a motion for summary judgment must consist of 
testimony that would be admissible at trial. Walker v. Rocky Mt. 
Recreation Corp.. 29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973). Moreover, 
6/ As addressed in appellant's opening brief, the article XIII, section 5 
facial challenges may also benefit from further factual development. 
App. Br. 39. Summary judgment may be granted in favor of appellant, 
however, if the Court concludes that the Act conflicts with the plain 
language of the Utah Constitution. 
- 16 -
appellant timely moved to strike the affidavit of Brent Gardner.7 
Respondents allegedly "uncontroverted" evidence regarding the 
impact of the Act on tax collection costs, therefore, is 
inadmissible and cannot be used to support the lower court's 
entry of summary judgment. 
The truth of the matter is that no one knows — at this point 
— what the actual impact of the Act has been. Respondents have 
not produced to date any admissible evidence demonstrating the 
impact of the Act on tax collection costs, and discovery in cases 
in other counties has been halted pending the decision of this 
Court. App. Br. 40 & n. 23. Appellant, accordingly, has been 
unable to obtain the information needed to verify the results of 
its pre-complaint investigation. See Exh. D to the Complaint. 
The necessary evidence, moreover, is in the sole control of 
respondents and the defendants in the 29 other lawsuits 
challenging the Act. On this record — where very few of the 
facts relevant to appellant's due process, equal protection and 
takings claims have been ascertained — summary judgment was 
decidedly premature. 
Respondents' sole response is that discovery is unnecessary 
because the Act imposes a "tax" and not a "fee" and therefore any 
factual development is irrelevant. Resp. Br. 37-44. This 
assertion, however, either ignores or seriously misconstrues 
established law. As set out in appellant's opening brief, the 
7/ Appellant also filed a timely motion to strike the Gardner affidavit 
on September 1, 1988. A copy of that motion is attached hereto as 
Exhibit A. 
- 17 -
due process, equal protection and takings claims turn, in large 
measure, upon whether the amount of the local levy imposed by the 
Act bears a reasonable relationship "to the services rendered." 
App. Br. 40-43; Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 
622 n. 12 (1981). This "reasonable relationship" requirement, 
moreover, does not — as respondents submit — disappear simply 
because the Act imposes a "tax" rather than a "fee." Resp. Br. 
39-43. 
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra, c i t e d by 
respondents (Resp. Br. 41-42) , demonstrates the lower cour t ' s 
p la in error in granting summary judgment on the present record. 
Commonwealth Edison holds that "there i s no requirement under the 
Due Process Clause that the amount of general revenue taxes 
c o l l e c t e d from a part icu lar a c t i v i t y must be reasonably re la ted 
to the value of the s erv i ce s provided to the a c t i v i t y . " 453 U.S. 
at 621 (emphasis added).8 The Supreme Court emphasized, 
however, that as for spec ia l purpose taxes — i . e . , taxes 
"assessed to reimburse the s t a t e for the c o s t s of providing a 
s p e c i f i c quant i f iable serv ice" (453 U.S. at 622 n. 12) — an 
e n t i r e l y d i f f erent rule appl ies ( i d . ) : 
As the Court has s ta ted , "such imposit ion, although 
termed a tax , cannot be t e s t e d by standards which 
general ly determine the v a l i d i t y of t a x e s . " 
In ter s ta t e Transit , Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183, 
8/ Respondents quote other portions of Commonwealth Edison at length to 
support the i r argument that a factual inquiry into the relat ionship 
between the amount of a tax and the cost of providing services i s 
i r re levant . Resp. Br. at 41. Those quotations, however, do not 
support respondents' argument because the quoted language addresses the 
Constitutional analysis of a general revenue tax, not a special purpose 
tax. 
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190 (1931). Because such charges are purportedly 
assessed to reimburse the State for costs incurred 
in providing specific quantifiable services, we 
have required a showing, based on factual evidence 
in the record, that "the fees charged to not appear 
to be manifestly disproportionate to the services 
rendered . . . ." Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 3 06 
U.S., at 599. See id, at 598-600; Inqels v. Morf. 
300 U.S., at 296-297. 
See also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 n.4 
(1987) (validity of special assessment taxes depends upon whether 
they result in the imposition of unfair or discriminatory burdens 
on a class of taxpayers). 
There can be little doubt but that the Act creates a special 
purpose tax. Indeed, the very title of the legislation states 
that it is "An Act Relating To Counties" which "Provid[es] for 
the Collection, Assessment, and Distribution Costs Charged by the 
County." Senate Bill No. 151. The tax established under the Act 
is included upon tax notices as "a separately listed and 
identified local levy." Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15(3) (emphasis 
added). Respondents, moreover, have never disputed that the 
"local levy" imposed by the Act is designed to cover only local 
tax collection costs. As such, the final determination of 
appellant's due process, equal protection and takings claims 
requires "a showing, based on factual evidence in the record," 
regarding the actual relationship between the tax imposed and the 
costs incurred. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. at 
622 n.12. Appellant improperly has been denied the opportunity 
to develop that factual record by the lower court's premature 
grant of summary judgment. The lower court's summary disposition 
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of the due process, equal protection and takings challenges, 
therefore, must be reversed.9 
IV. APPELLANT HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY 
OP THE ACT 
Contrary to respondents' assertion (Resp. Br. 44-46), 
appellant plainly has standing to challenge the constitutionality 
of the Act. This Court, in Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands 
& Forestry. 716 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1986), summarized the rules 
that confer standing upon a litigant in state court (citations 
omitted): 
The first general criterion is that the 
"[pjlaintiff must be able to show that he has 
suffered some distinct and palpable injury that 
gives him a personal stake in the outcome of the 
legal dispute." 
Second, if a Plaintiff does not have standing 
under the first criterion, he may have standing if 
no one else has a greater interest in the outcome 
of the case and the issues are unlikely to be 
raised at all unless that particular Plaintiff has 
standing to raise the issue. 
Third, even though standing is not found to 
exist under the first two criteria, a Plaintiff may 
nonetheless have standing if the issues are unique 
and of such great public importance that they ought 
to be decided in furtherance of the public 
interest. 
Appellant has standing under the first Terracor criterion. 
Moreover, even if standing is not conferred by the first 
criterion alone, appellant undoubtedly has standing under the 
second and third criteria. 
9/ The due process, equal protection and takings challenges to the Act 
are not insubstantial. One taxpayer in Millard County, for example, 
paid a "local levy" of over $1 million even though the county's entire 
tax collection budget was only $400,000. App. Br. 45). 
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Appellant is directly affected by the redistribution plan 
established by the Act. As an owner of real property in Garfield 
County, appellant must pay whatever assessment is levied under 
the Act by the State Tax Commission. Because that levy is 
established by the actions of other counties in which appellant 
may have no political input, appellant suffers a "direct and 
palpable injury" that certainly gives it "a personal stake in the 
outcome of the legal dispute." Terracor, 716 P.2d at 799. 
Indeed, the law is well established in Utah that taxpayers 
have standing to challenge illegal expenditures and illegal uses 
of public funds. Olson v. Salt Lake City School District, 724 
P.2d 960, 962 n.l (Utah 1986); Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 
1153 (Utah 1983). A taxpayer need show no injury other than an 
increased tax liability borne by all taxpayers alike. Jenkins v. 
Swan. 675 P.2d at 1153. As the Jenkins Court explained (id.) 
(citations omitted): 
"[A] taxpayer should be permitted to enjoin the 
unlawful expenditure of tax monies in which he has 
a pecuniary interest, or to prevent increased 
levies for illegal purposes." In arriving at this 
conclusion we quoted with approval the following 
language of the Illinois Supreme Court: "We have 
repeatedly held that taxpayers may resort to a 
court of equity to prevent the misapplication of 
public funds, and that this right is based upon the 
taxpayers' equitable ownership of such funds and 
their liability to replenish the public treasury 
for a deficiency which would be caused by the 
misappropriation." 
Article XIII, section 5 of the Utah Constitution prohibits the 
legislature from imposing a tax for the purpose of a county and 
prohibits forced revenue sharing without the consent of the 
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governmental e n t i t i e s involved. Appellant has standing to 
chal lenge the Act ' s contrary command.10 
Even i f appellant did not have standing under the f i r s t 
Terracor c r i t e r i o n , standing would be appropriate under the 
second factor . The primary impact of the Act i s on counties and 
t h e i r taxpayers. I t appears, however, that the counties have no 
i n t e r e s t in chal lenging the Act. See Resp. Br. 34-35. There i s , 
moreover, no group or persons in Garfield County that has a 
greater i n t e r e s t in chal lenging the net than appel lant . 1 1 
Indeed, the amount of tax paid by most county taxpayers pursuant 
to the Act would not j u s t i f y the expense of l i t i g a t i n g i t s 
v a l i d i t y . Accordingly, i t i s reasonable to conclude that , i f 
appel lant does not pursue t h i s ac t ion , no one w i l l . Appellant, 
therefore , has standing under the second Terracor c r i t e r i o n . 
Standing i s a l so appropriate under the th ird Terracor factor . 
The Act a f f e c t s v i r t u a l l y every taxpayer within the s t a t e by 
10/ Respondents submit that appel lant ' s standing is adversely affected by 
the fact that "Appellant paid less in Garfield County for costs of 
assessing and col lect ing property taxes than if Garfield County had 
been obligated to rely solely on i t s own tax base." Resp. Br. 45. 
Even if th i s submission were accurate (which cannot be determined at 
th is point because discovery has not been completed), i t is unavailing. 
The Act subjects appel lant ' s property to an unlawful tax levy. A 
taxpayer is en t i t l ed to bring an action to enjoin the col lect ion of an 
unlawful tax as well as to recover taxes unlawfully col lected. Jenkins 
v. Swan. 675 P.2d at 1153. Thus, whether appellant paid more or less 
tax in Garfield County as a resu l t of the Act is i r re levant to 
appel lant ' s standing. 
11/ Appellant owns substant ial property in Garfield County and pays a 
s ignif icant amount of tax pursuant to the Act. Most other taxpayers in 
the county own property having an assessed valuation substant ia l ly less 
than that of appel lant ' s property and pay a s ignif icant ly lower tax 
under the Act. 
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providing a financing method for the assessment and c o l l e c t i o n 
a c t i v i t i e s of every county in the s t a t e . Thus, the i s sues 
involved in t h i s l i t i g a t i o n are unique and of great public 
importance. Whether the method of financing loca l assessment and 
c o l l e c t i o n a c t i v i t i e s es tabl i shed by the Act i s cons t i tu t iona l i s 
an i s sue of major importance that should be decided by t h i s 
Court. 
At bottom, respondents' standing argument i s that Garfield 
County (along with the other 28 counties in the s ta te ) i s quite 
fond of the Act and does not wish i t to be challenged. Resp. Br, 
44-46.1 2 This asser t ion i s p la in ly i n s u f f i c i e n t to abrogate 
appe l lant ' s standing to press i t s cons t i tu t iona l complaint. 
Const i tut ional s t r i c t u r e s often place t i g h t and uncomfortable 
demands on governmental bodies . As a r e s u l t , l e g i s l a t i o n 
designed to evade cons t i tu t iona l s t r i c t u r e s — such as the Act — 
may wel l be warmly received by affected governmental e n t i t i e s . 
If technical "standing" requirements prevented c i t i z e n s u i t s in 
such circumstances, cons t i tu t iona l guarantees would be 
ev i scerated . Respondents' standing arguments, i f accepted by 
12/ Importantly, the counties ' affection for the Act has not been shared 
by the s t a t e ' s top law enforcement officer. The State of Utah has not 
defended the cons t i tu t ional i ty of the Act, and the Attorney General has 
previously concluded that the "Act unconsti tutionally intrudes on the 
r ight of local self-government vouchsafed to the counties under Article 
XIII, Section 5 . . ." (Resp. Br. at 31). While the Attorney General 
has acknowledged in th is case that the Attorney General's opinion is 
not binding on the Court and not an absolute determination of 
unconst i tut ional i ty , the Attorney General's opinion is not, as 
respondents claim, equivocal. (Resp. Br. at 4-5.) 
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this Court, would eviscerate article XIII, section 5 of the Utah 
Constitution. Those arguments, therefore, should be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
To the extent the constitutional issues presented are ripe 
for summary disposition, applicable law requires the entry of 
summary judgment in favor of appellant. If the Court concludes 
that the present claims require further factual development, the 
judgment below must be reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of July, 1989. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
Marjfe K. Bticfri 
L. R. C u r t i s , J r . 
R i c h i e D. Haddock 
Richard G. Wi lk ins 
IPAP/AH3 
4 
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A t t o r n e y s for P l a i n t i f f 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR GARFIELD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE ) 
AND TELEGRAPH CO., ] 
Plaintiff, 
V • 
GARFIELD COUNTY; THE 
GARFIELD COUNTY BOARD OF ] 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; 
THOMAS HATCH, SHERRELL OTT, 
AND LOUISE LISTON, COUNTY ] 
COMMISSIONERS; JUDY HENRIE, ' 
COUNTY TREASURER; TOM 
SIMKINS, COUNTY ASSESSOR; 
THE UTAH STATE TAX ] 
COMMISSION; R. H. "HAL" ] 
HANSEN, ROGER O. TEW, 
G. BLAINE DAVIS AND JOE B. 
PACHECO, UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSIONERS; TOM L. ALLEN, ] 
UTAH STATE AUDITOR; EDWARD T.' 
ALTER, UTAH STATE TREASURER, , 
Defendants. 
i MOTION TO STRIKE 
i Case No. 3273 
i Judge Don V. Tibbs 
P l a i n t i f f , Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph 
Company ("Mountain Bel l") , respect fu l ly moves the court to 
s t r i k e the Affidavit of L. Brent Gardiner submitted in 
connection with Defendants' Opposition to P l a i n t i f f ' s Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Gardiner Affidavit"). The 
bases for this motion are as follows: 
A. The Gardiner Affidavit is Based on Hearsay. 
The Gardiner Affidavit contains representations 
concerning the "costs" of assessment, collection and 
distribution of property taxes. Affidavits submitted in 
support and opposition of a motion for summary judgment must 
contain testimony that would be admissible at trial. Walker 
v. Rocky Mt. Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 
(1973). As paragraph 5 of the Gardiner Affidavit admits, the 
allegations covering the cost of assessing, collecting, and 
distributing, property taxes were provided by the County 
Auditors. The allegations are therefore hearsay. See U.R. 
Evid. 801(c). The County Auditor's cost figures likewise are 
hearsay because he must have relied on the statements of other 
county employees. 
The Gardiner Affidavit contains no allegations that 
would place either Mr. Gardiner's representations or the 
representations of the county auditors on which he relies 
within any exception to the hearsay rule. The allegations 
contained in the body of the Gardiner Affidavit are based on 
the exhibits attached to the Gardiner Affidavit. The attached 
exhibits are also hearsay and the Gardiner Affidavit does not 
establish sufficient foundation for those exhibits to come in 
as business records. The Gardiner Affidavit contains no 
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allegation that those exhibits were prepared at or near the 
time the costs were incurred, at or near the time the county 
auditors prepared their reports, or even at or near the time 
the county auditors provided Mr. Gardiner with the underlying 
data. Moreover, the Gardiner Affidavit does not establish 
that the Utah Association of Counties has a regular practice 
of keeping compilations of counties' tax collection costs. 
Rather, the Gardiner Affidavit admits that the exhibits were 
prepared for presentation to the legislature in connection 
with the Utah Association of Counties' lobbying efforts. 
Therefore, the exhibits are not admissible as business 
records. See U.R. Evid. 803(6). Cf. Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 
P.2d 413 (Utah 1987). (Business record exception inapplicable 
where there is no evidence that the activity was regularly 
conducted or that the compilation was contemporaneous with the 
relevant transaction). See also Adams v. New Jersey State 
Fair, 71 N.J. Super. 528, 177 A.2d 486 (1962) (error to admit 
accounting compilations prepared from previous year's ledger). 
The Gardiner Affidavit must therefore be stricken because it 
is based on hearsay. 
The Gardiner Affidavit also fails to establish that 
the county auditors' representations concerning "costs" fall 
within an exception to the Hearsay Rule. The affidavit 
provides no explanation whatsoever of the basis of the county 
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auditors' representations. The Gardiner Affidavit must 
therefore be stricken because it contains hearsay within 
hearsay. 
B. There is not Sufficient Foundation for the 
Conclusions Contained in the Gardiner Affidavit. 
The Gardiner Affidavit is also inadmissible because 
it contains conclusory allegations which lack adequate 
foundation. The alleged "cost" of assessment, collection and 
distribution is a meaningless conclusion. Whether each of the 
specific line items that Garfield County claims constitute its 
"cost" is truly a cost of collection, assessment and 
distribution is a contested issue in this case. Other 
counties in this state have admitted that they are "padding" 
their collection and assessment budgets with items that are 
not truly costs of property tax collection. Defendants cannot 
now present such conclusory allegations in an attempt to 
prevent Plaintiff from conducting discovery to ascertain what 
line items Garfield County is claiming as costs. The Court 
must, therefore, strike the Gardiner Affidavit. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31 da^of August, 1988, 
HOLME ROBER 
krhp/ddO 
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